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Abstract
Within a query-based communication protocol, bounded recall can make communication more credible and improve bargaining outcomes. In a laboratory bargaining experiment, sellers privately observe the realized value and provide uninformed buyers with multi-attribute reports before negotiating price. Bounded seller recall makes consistent misreporting more difficult, thereby (i) increasing truthful reporting, (ii) raising acceptance rates, and (iii) reducing inequality and boosting total surplus. Seller-selected questions weaken these gains. The cognitive burden of sustaining a fabrication thus emerges as a distinct source of credibility, and question-selection authority as a lever of bargaining power.
External presentation
† indicates presentations by the coauthor
- Economic Science Association World Meeting† (Los Angeles, 2026)
- 12th Annual Workshop on Behavioural Game Theory † (University of East Anglia, 2026)
- Helsinki Graduate School of Economics† (2026)
- Ostrom-Smith Conference (Purdue University, 2026)
- Chinese Economists Society 2026 North America Annual Conference† (Atlanta, 2026)
- Economic Science Association North American Meeting† (Tucson, 2025)
- 18th Annual Behavioral Operations Conference† (Hamburg, 2025)
- 8th Annual Texas Experimental Association Symposium† (Baylor University, 2025)