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Abstract
In a laboratory bargaining experiment with a query-and-answer stage, informed sellers privately observe the realized value and provide buyers with multi-attribute reports before negotiating the price. Bounded recall makes fabrication harder than truth-telling: misreporting sellers must recall attributes they can no longer see. Relative to perfect recall, bounded recall increases truthful reporting, acceptance rates, and total surplus, while reducing inequality among realized trades. Buyers respond to the internal consistency of sellers’ answers. Seller-selected questions weaken these gains. The cognitive burden of sustaining a fabrication thus generates credibility, while control over question selection shapes bargaining power.
External presentation
† indicates presentations by the coauthor
- Economic Science Association World Meeting† (Los Angeles, 2026)
- 12th Annual Workshop on Behavioural Game Theory † (University of East Anglia, 2026)
- Helsinki Graduate School of Economics† (2026)
- Ostrom-Smith Conference (Purdue University, 2026)
- Chinese Economists Society 2026 North America Annual Conference† (Atlanta, 2026)
- Economic Science Association North American Meeting† (Tucson, 2025)
- 18th Annual Behavioral Operations Conference† (Hamburg, 2025)
- 8th Annual Texas Experimental Association Symposium† (Baylor University, 2025)